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ASYMMETRIES IN THE RESPONSES OF REGIONAL JOB FLOWS TO OIL
PRICE SHOCKS
MOHAMAD B. KARAKI∗
This paper studies the effect of oil price innovations on manufacturing job flows
across U.S. states. First, I estimate a nonlinear structural equation model and com-
pute impulse response functions by Monte Carlo integration. I find asymmetries in the
responses of job flows to positive and negative oil price innovations. Yet, these asymme-
tries do not pass a test of symmetry on the impulse responses, especially after accounting
for data mining. Third, I use a test for the absence of job reallocation to evaluate whether
an unexpected increase in the real price of oil price triggers an important change in job
reallocation. I find that oil price shocks have limited regional allocative effects. (JEL
E24, E32, Q43)
I. INTRODUCTION
Differences in unemployment rates across
U.S. regions and states are well documented.
For instance, it is well known that Texas tends
to have an unemployment rate that is lower than
the national average, whereas other states like
Michigan often experience an unemployment
rate that exceeds the U.S. national unemployment
rate. Yet, little is known about the fundamental
labor dynamics behind these differences. Specif-
ically, little is known on how the number of jobs
created and destroyed by establishment responds
to economic shocks.
In this paper, I study the effect of oil price
shocks on manufacturing job creation and job
destruction across U.S. states. Recently, Herrera
and Karaki (2015) have examined the effect of
oil price shocks on job flows in disaggregated
manufacturing industries. While work by Herrera
and Karaki (2015) contributes to learning about
U.S. business cycles, this study contributes to
the literature interested in studying regional U.S.
business cycles. In particular, this paper investi-
gates the effect of positive and negative oil price
innovations on regional job flows and examines
whether positive oil price shocks trigger a signif-
icant change in job reallocation.
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After the 1970s stagflation, economic research
on the effect of oil price shocks on economic
activity has surged. Many empirical papers found
that positive oil price shocks are a major source
of economic fluctuations, whereas negative oil
price shocks only generate mild and insignifi-
cant effects on output.1 The view that positive
and negative oil price innovations have asym-
metric effects on U.S. economic activity have
been reinforced using slope-based test of sym-
metry (see Cuñado and de Gracia 2003; Jiménez-
Rodríguez and Sánchez 2005; Mork, Olsen, and
Mysen 1994).
Recently, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011)—
hereafter KV (2011)—have questioned the
consensus reached in the early 2000s literature
on the asymmetry in the relationship between
oil prices and output. They claim that previ-
ous empirical papers that rejected the null of
symmetry in the relationship between oil prices
and the macroeconomy are based on censored
1. See, e.g., Mork 1989; Loungani 1986; Davis 1987a,
1987b; and Hooker 1996.
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vector autoregressive models. In their paper, KV
(2011) explicitly demonstrate how these models
can lead to biased and inconsistent estimates,
which often exaggerate the impact of oil prices
on economic activity. They further explain why
the textbook orthogonalized impulse response
functions (IRF)—heavily used in the litera-
ture in forecasting the nonlinear impact of oil
prices—are not informative about the degree of
asymmetry in the response to an oil price shock,
and emphasize the importance of computing
IRF by Monte Carlo integration that account for
the history and the size of the shock (see Koop,
Pesaran, and Potter 1996). In addition, KV
(2011) show that slope-based tests cannot reveal
whether the responses of economic activity to
positive and negative oil price shocks are sym-
metric. Instead, they propose a test of symmetry
on the IRF and find that the relationship between
oil prices and gross domestic product (GDP)
growth (or consumption and unemployment rate)
is well captured by a linear model. While there
seems to be ample evidence in the recent litera-
ture that the null of symmetry cannot be rejected
using aggregate macroeconomic variables, work
by Herrera, Lagalo, and Wada (2011) shows
that the null of symmetry is rejected for some
disaggregated industrial production indices.
In theory, oil price shocks affect the macroe-
conomy through both direct and indirect supply
and demand channels (see Kilian 2014). Direct
channels imply symmetry in the response of eco-
nomic activity to positive and negative oil price
innovations, whereas indirect channels generate
amplifications and asymmetry in the responses.
By direct demand side effects, I refer to the
change in purchasing power upon an oil price
shock, which leads to a symmetric change in
aggregate demand (see Baumeister and Kilian
2017; Baumeister, Kilian, and Zhou 2017). On
the other hand, there are indirect demand side
effects that generate asymmetries and amplifica-
tion in the response of output to an unexpected
oil price shock due to increases in precautionary
saving associated with heightened uncertainty
(see Bernanke 1983; Edelstein and Kilian 2009;
Pindyck 1991). For instance, an increase or a
decrease in the price of oil will increase uncer-
tainty and push households to increase their pre-
cautionary saving. As a result, regardless of the
direction in the change of the price of oil, con-
sumption expenditure will decrease which will
increase the adverse effect associated with an oil
price increase andmitigate the benefits associated
with an oil price decline. By direct supply side
effects, I refer to the change in the cost of pro-
duction associated with oil price shocks, which
leads to a symmetric change in aggregate sup-
ply (see Rotemberg and Woodford 1996). On the
other hand, I refer to the deployment of labor
and capital across sectors as the indirect supply
side effects that generate an asymmetric impact
on output and employment (see Davis 1987a,
1987b; Davis and Haltiwanger 2001; Hamilton
1988). The costly sectoral reallocation channel
implies that regardless of the sign of the oil price
shock, resources will choose to relocate from
most affected to least affected sectors creating
a mismatch in the labor market. This channel
of transmission will amplify the negative effects
associated with higher oil prices and reduce the
positive effects generated with lower oil prices.
This paper has four main contributions. First
unlike previous studies (e.g., Davis and Halti-
wanger 2001; Herrera and Karaki 2015; Her-
rera, Karaki, and Rangaraju 2017) that solely
focus on industry-level data within the manufac-
turing sector, this study analyzes the effect of oil
price shocks on manufacturing job flows across
U.S. states. Studies that use disaggregated data
by industry are often based on a small sample
due to the change in the industry classification
from Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to
North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) in the late 1990s. Our sample covers a
variety of oil price shocks episodes including the
recent oil price decline in 2014.
Second, I use a nonlinear structural model
building on KV (2011) and Herrera and Karaki
(2015) methods that nest both symmetric and
asymmetric effects associated with the transmis-
sion of oil prices to the economy, and compute
IRF by Monte Carlo integration to analyze the
effect of positive and negative oil price inno-
vations on manufacturing job creation and job
destruction across U.S. states. Results show
important heterogeneity in the responses of job
flows. In addition, I find important asymmetries
in the responses of job creation and job destruc-
tion to positive and negative oil price innovations.
A closer look at the 1-year cumulative effects
reveals that the responses of job creation and job
destruction to a negative oil price shock are at
least as large as the responses of job flows to a
positive oil price shock.
Third, I evaluate whether the responses of job
flows to positive and negative oil price shocks
are asymmetric by using a test of symmetry
following KV (2011) and Herrera and Karaki
(2015). Using conventional critical values, I
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find no evidence against the null of symmetry
for a 1 standard deviation (1 SD) shock. For a
2 standard deviations (2 SD) shock, the null of
symmetry is rejected for a few states. Yet, the
evidence against the null of symmetry vanishes
for all states after using data mining robust criti-
cal values. This result is in line with Engermann,
Owyang, and Wall (2014) who find no evidence
of asymmetry in the response of payroll employ-
ment across states to positive and negative oil
price shocks.
Fourth, while previous work by Davis and
Haltiwanger (2001) and Herrera and Karaki
(2015) have studied whether oil price shocks
operate through costly sectoral reallocation
channels, this paper investigates whether positive
oil price shocks trigger significant reallocation
of jobs across U.S. states. Investigating the
transmission mechanism through which oil price
shocks affect regional economies directly con-
tributes to the literature interested in studying
disparities and commonality of regional U.S.
business cycles (see Engermann, Owyang, and
Wall 2014; Hamilton and Owyang 2012; Karaki
2017). To evaluate whether positive oil price
shocks have a significant effect on job reallo-
cation, I follow Herrera and Karaki (2015) and
implement a test of the absence of job realloca-
tion. I find no evidence against the null of the
absence of job reallocation for a shock of 1 SD.
I also find that an unexpected positive oil price
shock of 2 SD has no effect on job reallocation
across all U.S. states especially after accounting
for data mining.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section II discusses the data on regional job flows
and oil prices. I present the model in Section
III. Section IV explores the empirical results.
Section V conducts a test of symmetry à la KV
(2011) to investigate whether the responses of job
flows are symmetric to positive and negative oil
price innovations. Section VI evaluates whether
a positive oil price shock has significant regional
allocative effects. Section VII concludes.
II. JOB CREATION, JOB DESTRUCTION, AND OIL
PRICES
I used two databases on quarterly state-level
manufacturing job creation and job destruction
data to study the effect of oil prices on job flows
across U.S. states. For the 1972:Q2 to 1998:Q4
period, I obtain data from the Gross Job Flows
database (1996, 2005) by Davis, Haltiwanger,
and Shuh. For the 1999:Q1 to 2015:Q3, I use the
Business Employment Dynamics database from
the Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
As defined by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996), job creation represents the sum of
employment gains at expanding and entering
establishments and job destruction represents
the sum of employment losses at contracting
and exiting establishments. These job flows
measures are computed as job creation and job
destruction rates, POSt and NEGt. Following
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), I define
the net growth rate of employment for state j at
time t as:
(1) NETj,t = POSj,t − NEGj,t,
and the job reallocation rate is defined as the sum
of POSj, t and NEGj, t.
(2) SUMj,t = POSj,t + NEGj,t,
As an indicator for labor market flexibility, I
define the excess job reallocation rate as:
(3) EXCj,t = POSj,t −
|||NETj,t
||| .
This measure of job reallocation reflects the
amount of reallocation that would have been nec-
essary to offset the changes in net employment
growth.2
Regarding the oil price measures, I com-
pute nominal oil prices using the imported U.S.
crude oil refiners acquisition cost reported by the
Energy Information Agency. Then, I obtain the
real oil price by deflating the nominal price of oil
with the consumer price index (CPI). In themodel
section, I define xt as the percentage change in the
real price of oil and x#t as a nonlinear transforma-
tion of oil prices.
I use two different nonlinear transformations
of the natural logarithm of the real oil price
ot. The first measure is Mork’s (1989) oil price
increase. This measure was motivated by Mork’s
(1989) claim that oil price increases lead to sig-
nificant economic downturns while decreases in
oil prices have no effect on economic activity.
This nonlinear transformation of oil prices sets
the value of x#t equal to zero for any period where
the oil price change was negative:
(4) x1t = max
{
0, ln
(
ot
)
− ln
(
ot−1
)}
.
2. Note that the excess job reallocation rate is themeasure
that is known for tracking flexibility in the labor market (see
Cuñat and Melitz 2012; Micco and Pagés 2004).
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The second censored oil price measure used in
our analysis is the Hamilton net oil price increase
measure (Hamilton 1996). This measure set x#t
equal to zero for the oil price increases that do
not exceed the previous year’s maximum:
(5) x4t = max
{
0, ln
(
ot
)
−max
{
0, ln
(
ot−1
)
, … , ln
(
ot−4
)}}
.
As suggested by Hamilton (1996, 2003), this
nonlinear transformation of oil prices is known
for successfully capturing the nonlinear relation-
ship between the price of oil and U.S. aggregate
economic activity.
III. MODEL
To study the effect of oil price shocks on job
creation and job destruction, I estimate the fol-
lowing structural model using four quarterly lags:
(6a) xt = a10 +
p∑
i=1
a11,ixt−i +
p∑
i=1
a12,iNEGj,t−i +
p∑
i=1
a13,iPOSj,t−i + ϵ1,t
(6b) NEGj,t = a20 +
p∑
i=0
a21,ixt−i +
p∑
i=1
a22,iNEGj,t−i +
p∑
i=1
a23,iPOSj,t−i +
p∑
i=0
g21,ix
#
t−i + ϵ2,t
(6c) POSj,t = a30 +
p∑
i=0
a31,ixt−i +
p∑
i=0
a32,iNEGj,t−i +
p∑
i=1
a33,iPOSj,t−i +
p∑
i=0
g31,ix
#
t−i + ϵ3,t
where xt stands for the percentage change in
oil prices, x#t refers to any of the two nonlinear
transformation of oil prices defined in Section
II, POSj, t is the job creation rate in state j,
NEGj, t is the job destruction rate in state j, and
ϵt = [ϵ1 , t, ϵ2 , t,ϵ3 , t] is a vector of contemporane-
ously and serially uncorrelated innovations.3 I
follow Herrera and Karaki (2015) and impose the
following identification restrictions. Oil prices
3. Note that model (6a–c) is run separately for each state.
are assumed to be predetermined to job destruc-
tion and job creation. This assumption is consis-
tent with work by Kilian and Vega (2011) who
found that oil prices do not respond contempo-
raneously to employment. I also assume that job
destruction does not respond contemporaneously
to changes in job creation because of staggered
labor contracts.4 The model in (6a–c) can be
estimated efficiently by ordinary least squares
(OLS). Given that the model is nonlinear in xt,
textbook IRFwill convey misleading information
on the effect of oil price innovations (see Gallant,
Rossi, and Tauchen 1993; Kilian and Vigfusson
2011; Koop, Pesaran, and Potter 1996). There-
fore, I compute IRF by Monte Carlo integration
that account for the history and the size of the
shock.5
IV. IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTIONS AND
QUANTITATIVE EFFECTS
In this section, I compute the effect of typ-
ical (δ= 1 SD) and large (δ= 2 SD) oil price
4. See Herrera and Karaki (2015) and Herrera, Karaki,
andRangaraju (2017). Note also that the results are insensitive
to ordering job creation before job destruction.
5. An explanation on how to compute the IRF by Monte
Carlo integration is available in the Appendix.
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innovations on job flows across U.S. states.6
Even though it is well known that most oil price
innovations, specifically two-thirds of the oil
price innovations, have a magnitude of 1 SD (see
Kilian and Vigfusson, 2017), Hamilton (2011)
argues that researchers are often interested in the
consequences of extraordinary events when they
analyze the effect of oil price shocks. Therefore,
despite the high uncertainty associated with
estimating large oil price shocks, I discuss in
this section the effect of oil price shocks for two
different magnitudes.
A. The Effect of a Typical Shock
Figure 1 (Figure 2) reflects the responses of
job creation (job destruction) to positive and neg-
ative oil price innovations of 1 SD using theMork
(1989) oil price increase measure as a nonlinear
transformation for the real price of oil.7 Results
based on the Hamilton (1996) net oil price
increase measure are delineated in Appendix
S1, Supporting Information. The 95% and 90%
confidence bands are designated by squares and
diamonds, respectively. To get a better grasp
on whether the responses of job creation (job
destruction) are asymmetric to oil price shocks, I
report the negative of the response of job creation
(job destruction) to a negative oil price shock.
Figure 1 reveals important differences in the
responses of job creation across U.S. states. For
instance 1 year after the shock, an unanticipated
increase (decrease) of 15% in the real price of oil
triggers a reduction (an increase) of 0.23 (0.19)
percentage points in job creation for Michigan,
a state that is home to the three largest U.S.
automakers. These results are in contrast to what
I find for a major oil-producing state like Texas,
where the 1-year cumulative effect is equiva-
lent to a 0.38 (0.52) percentage point increase
(decrease) in job creation. Moreover, Figure 1
reveals that the response of job creation to pos-
itive and negative oil price innovations is asym-
metric for most states except for Connecticut,
Louisiana, and Idaho. Table 2 reports the 1-year
cumulative effects of positive and negative oil
price innovations on job flows. Interestingly, I
find that in absolute terms the 1-year cumula-
tive response of job creation to a negative oil
6. The figures for the remaining states are available in
Appendix S1 (see Figure A.1a–c and Figure A.2a–c). Note
also that the impulse responses are similar to the responses
based on the 1-year net oil price increase nonlinear transfor-
mation of the real price of oil (see Figure A.7a–c and Figure
A.8a–c of Appendix S1).
7. A 1 standard deviation shock is around 15%.
price shock is larger than the 1-year cumula-
tive response of job creation to a positive oil
price shock for total manufacturing and 29 out of
40U.S. states. This finding indicates that job cre-
ation across states is more responsive to negative
than to positive oil price innovations.8
Job destruction responds in the same direction
to oil price increases and decreases for several
U.S. states (see Figure 2). For instance, Table 2
reveals that for Michigan an unexpected increase
(decrease) in the real price of oil price by 15%
leads to a 1-year cumulative effect of 0.70 (0.62)
percentage points on job destruction. These
findings suggest that fluctuations in oil prices
create larger search and matching problems in
such states. Mismatches in the labor market
are less prevalent for oil-producing states like
Texas and Oklahoma. In both of these states, job
destruction decreases following a negative oil
price shock and increases following a positive oil
price shock. For example, an unexpected oil price
increase (decrease) triggers a 0.60 (1.33) per-
centages points fall (increase) in job destruction
rate for Oklahoma. Moreover, Table 2 shows that
the 1-year cumulative response of job destruction
to a negative oil price shock is larger than the
1-year cumulative response of job destruction to
a positive oil price shock for total manufacturing
and 32 out of 40U.S. states. These findings
indicate that, similar to job creation, state-level
job destruction responds more to negative than
to positive oil price innovations.
How does the net employment change across
states responds to positive and negative oil price
innovations of 1 SD (i.e., 15%)? Table 2 reveals
that the 1-year cumulative effect of a positive oil
price shock on net employment is negative for
total manufacturing and 19 out of 40 states. In
face of an unexpected oil price increase, employ-
ment falls the most in Michigan, whereas states
that tend to benefit the most are Oklahoma and
Texas. Interestingly, the effect of a negative oil
price shock on net employment is negative for
total manufacturing and 39 out of 40 states. In
fact, for almost all states, a negative oil price
innovation triggers a larger change in net employ-
ment compared to a positive oil price innovation.
These results indicate that reductions in oil prices
do not stimulate employment across states and
reveal that net employment is more affected with
negative than positive oil price innovations.
8. I report the cumulative responses of job flows for the
net oil price increase measure in Appendix S1 (see Table A.1).
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FIGURE 1
The Responses of Job Creation to Positive and Negative Oil Price Shocks of 1 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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FIGURE 2
The Responses of Job Destruction to Positive and Negative Oil Price Shocks of 1 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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TABLE 1
Summary Statistics for Job Flows
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 4.51 8.91 −4.40 13.41 8.96
Alabama 7.64 3.81 3.83 11.45 7.08
Arkansas 7.92 4.60 3.32 12.53 7.96
Arizona 6.03 6.37 −0.34 12.40 8.75
California 5.96 5.20 0.76 11.15 9.37
Colorado 5.92 4.33 1.59 10.25 8.47
Connecticut 6.86 4.20 2.66 11.06 8.05
Florida 5.33 5.58 −0.25 10.91 9.00
Georgia 5.04 7.30 −2.26 12.34 10.04
Iowa 5.41 4.97 0.43 10.38 9.07
Idaho 6.72 5.00 1.71 11.72 9.30
Illinois 4.41 9.37 −4.96 13.77 8.70
Indiana 3.72 10.98 −7.26 14.70 7.42
Kansas 5.70 8.34 −2.65 14.04 11.10
Kentucky 7.91 5.13 2.78 13.03 9.95
Louisiana 5.93 6.66 −0.73 12.59 10.33
Massachusetts 6.68 6.31 0.37 12.99 11.74
Maryland 7.19 5.11 2.07 12.30 10.15
Maine 6.65 4.92 1.74 11.57 9.35
Michigan 5.47 7.00 −1.52 12.47 10.16
Minnesota 5.74 6.30 −0.56 12.04 10.79
Missouri 6.06 5.01 1.05 11.07 9.66
Mississippi 6.37 4.65 1.72 11.03 8.91
Montana 5.46 5.56 −0.11 11.02 9.15
North Carolina 5.55 5.79 −0.23 11.34 10.16
Nebraska 6.08 3.95 2.13 10.03 7.83
New Hampshire 5.67 4.14 1.53 9.81 7.89
New Jersey 5.37 4.48 0.90 9.85 7.94
Nevada 5.14 6.00 −0.86 11.14 9.73
New York 4.45 3.62 0.84 8.07 6.99
Ohio 4.99 4.53 0.47 9.52 7.13
Oklahoma 4.45 5.23 −0.78 9.68 7.92
Oregon 4.81 6.87 −2.06 11.68 9.50
Pennsylvania 4.15 7.98 −3.82 12.13 8.17
South Carolina 5.26 6.58 −1.33 11.84 9.27
Tennessee 6.00 5.03 0.97 11.03 8.61
Texas 4.82 7.07 −2.25 11.88 9.21
Utah 4.89 5.50 −0.61 10.40 8.84
Virginia 4.95 5.14 −0.19 10.09 7.94
Washington 3.89 7.40 −3.51 11.30 7.79
Wisconsin 4.18 9.80 −5.63 13.98 8.23
The response of job reallocation to oil price
innovations differs greatly across U.S. states.
The 1-year cumulative effect associated with a
positive (negative) oil price shock on gross job
reallocation is 0.47 (0.81) percentage points for
Michigan and 1.79 (−1.33) percentage points for
Nevada (see Table 2). Interestingly, the 1-year
cumulative response of gross job reallocation and
excess job reallocation to a negative oil price
shock is larger in absolute terms than the cumula-
tive effects triggered by a positive oil price shock
for most states. Moreover, I find that regardless of
the oil price change direction, the 1-year cumula-
tive response of the excess job reallocation rate is
negative for almost all U.S. states, which suggests
a reduction in labormarket fluidity (see Davis and
Haltiwanger 2014).
B. The Effect of a Large Oil Price Shock
How much larger is the response of job flows
to oil price innovations of 2 SD? Figures 3 and
4 report the responses of job creation and job
destruction to positive and negative oil price inno-
vations of 2 SD (i.e., 30%). The reported results
are based on the Mork (1989) oil price increase
nonlinear transformation for the real price of oil.9
Figure 3 shows important heterogeneity in the
responses of job creation to positive and negative
9. Results for remaining states are available in Appendix
S1 (see Figure A.3a–c and Figure A.4a–c). Figure A.9a–c
and Figure A.10a–c of Appendix S1 reveal that using the
1-year net oil price increase nonlinear transformation of the
real price of oil generates similar results. Note also that the
cumulative effects on job flows for the net oil price increase
measure are reported in Table A.2.
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FIGURE 3
The Responses of Job Creation to Positive and Negative Oil Price Shocks of 2 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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TABLE 2
Cumulative Effects of Oil Price Innovations of 1 SD (x#t = x
1
t )
Positive Shock Negative Shock
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.10 0.12 −0.02 0.22 −0.16 −0.15 0.38 −0.53 0.23 −0.37
Alabama −0.01 0.05 −0.06 0.04 −0.45 −0.12 0.44 −0.56 0.33 −0.34
Arkansas −0.09 −0.39 0.30 −0.48 −1.11 −0.06 0.54 −0.60 0.48 −0.17
Arizona 0.18 −0.40 0.59 −0.22 −1.12 −0.41 0.83 −1.24 0.42 −0.85
California 0.43 −0.11 0.54 0.33 −0.28 −0.63 0.32 −0.95 −0.31 −1.27
Colorado 0.32 −0.22 0.54 0.09 −0.80 −0.62 0.65 −1.28 0.03 −1.28
Connecticut 0.43 −0.18 0.61 0.25 −0.47 −0.46 0.55 −1.01 0.09 −0.93
Florida 0.31 0.13 0.18 0.43 −0.11 −0.45 0.35 −0.80 −0.10 −0.95
Georgia 0.00 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 −0.51 −0.14 0.55 −0.69 0.41 −0.35
Iowa −0.23 −0.72 0.49 −0.95 −2.04 0.11 0.92 −0.81 1.03 0.14
Idaho −0.80 0.29 −1.09 −0.50 −1.94 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.23 −1.71
Illinois 0.09 0.14 −0.05 0.24 −0.25 −0.20 0.33 −0.54 0.13 −0.50
Indiana −0.13 0.25 −0.38 0.12 −0.64 0.05 0.40 −0.35 0.45 −0.58
Kansas −0.51 −0.12 −0.39 −0.63 −1.55 0.22 0.50 −0.28 0.73 0.00
Kentucky 0.00 0.12 −0.12 0.12 −0.17 −0.18 0.24 −0.42 0.06 −0.41
Louisiana 0.54 0.11 0.43 0.66 −0.17 −0.58 0.23 −0.81 −0.34 −1.20
Massachusetts 0.37 −0.18 0.55 0.18 −0.42 −0.43 0.64 −1.07 0.21 −0.87
Maryland −0.15 −0.22 0.07 −0.37 −0.84 0.01 0.21 −0.20 0.21 −0.19
Maine −0.07 0.10 −0.17 0.02 −0.80 −0.29 0.43 −0.72 0.14 −1.19
Michigan −0.23 0.70 −0.92 0.47 −0.62 0.19 0.62 −0.43 0.81 −0.97
Minnesota 0.33 0.08 0.25 0.41 −0.14 −0.45 0.22 −0.67 −0.23 −1.03
Missouri 0.10 −0.01 0.11 0.09 −0.24 −0.26 0.64 −0.90 0.39 −0.53
Mississippi −0.07 0.03 −0.10 −0.05 −0.63 0.02 0.29 −0.26 0.31 −0.21
Montana −0.25 0.36 −0.61 0.12 −2.21 −0.01 −0.20 0.20 −0.21 −1.28
North Carolina −0.18 −0.14 −0.03 −0.32 −0.77 0.02 0.53 −0.52 0.55 −0.08
Nebraska 0.44 0.22 0.22 0.65 −0.07 −0.76 −0.06 −0.70 −0.82 −1.58
New Hampshire 0.36 −0.25 0.62 0.11 −0.51 −0.63 0.62 −1.24 −0.01 −1.26
New Jersey 0.13 −0.16 0.29 −0.03 −0.49 −0.30 0.38 −0.68 0.09 −0.60
Nevada 0.79 1.00 −0.21 1.79 0.78 −0.99 −0.34 −0.66 −1.33 −2.60
New York 0.48 0.04 0.44 0.52 −0.06 −0.56 0.31 −0.87 −0.25 −1.13
Ohio 0.02 0.11 −0.09 0.13 −0.40 −0.09 0.59 −0.67 0.50 −0.59
Oklahoma 0.55 −0.60 1.15 −0.04 −1.36 −0.71 1.33 −2.03 0.62 −1.44
Oregon 0.21 0.27 −0.06 0.48 −0.75 −0.29 0.21 −0.50 −0.08 −1.18
Pennsylvania 0.14 −0.15 0.29 0.00 −0.51 −0.19 0.49 −0.68 0.31 −0.43
South Carolina 0.06 −0.45 0.50 −0.39 −1.04 −0.22 0.75 −0.97 0.54 −0.45
Tennessee 0.07 0.18 −0.12 0.25 −0.26 −0.20 0.35 −0.55 0.15 −0.51
Texas 0.38 −0.54 0.92 −0.17 −1.09 −0.52 0.85 −1.37 0.33 −1.04
Utah 0.07 0.37 −0.30 0.44 −0.99 −0.40 −0.04 −0.36 −0.44 −1.51
Virginia −0.13 −0.07 −0.06 −0.20 −0.71 0.05 0.39 −0.34 0.44 −0.08
Washington 0.32 0.07 0.25 0.39 −0.57 −0.65 0.28 −0.93 −0.36 −1.43
Wisconsin −0.01 0.17 −0.19 0.16 −0.50 −0.06 0.26 −0.32 0.20 −0.44
oil price innovations. Following an unexpected
increase (decrease) of 30% in the real price of oil,
the 1-year cumulative response of job creation
ranges between −2.44 (−2.26) percentage points
for Idaho (Nevada) and 1.29 (0.32) percentage
points for Nevada (Michigan). Moreover, the
response of job creation to a 30% oil price shock
is more than twice as large as the response of job
creation to a 15% oil price shock for more than
half of U.S. states. Furthermore, the response
of job creation to positive and negative oil price
innovations reveal sharp asymmetries for (h< 4).
As in the case for a 1 SD shock, the 1-year cumu-
lative response of job creation to a large shock is
more responsive to a negative than a positive oil
price shock for total manufacturing and 29 out of
40U.S. states. The 1-year cumulative response of
job creation to a positive shock is negative for 21
out of 40 states, whereas the 1-year cumulative
response of job creation to a negative shock is
negative for 38 out of 40 states.
I also find important differences in the
responses of job destruction to oil price shocks.
The cumulative response of job destruction
brought about by a 30% oil price shock is more
than twice as large of that generated by a 15%
oil price shock (see Table 3). For instance, the
1-year cumulative change in job destruction
after an unexpected 30% increase (decrease) in
the real price of oil is 3.12 (2.83) percentage
KARAKI: OIL PRICES AND REGIONAL JOB FLOWS 1837
TABLE 3
Cumulative Effects of Oil Price Innovations of 2 SD (x#t = x
1
t )
Positive Shock Negative Shock
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.14 0.88 −0.75 1.02 0.15 −0.36 1.34 −1.71 0.98 −0.73
Alabama −0.18 0.72 −0.91 0.54 −0.54 −0.39 1.47 −1.86 1.08 −0.79
Arkansas −0.38 −0.58 0.20 −0.95 −2.31 −0.30 1.26 −1.55 0.96 −0.59
Arizona 0.04 −0.22 0.26 −0.17 −2.22 −1.12 2.22 −3.34 1.09 −2.25
California 0.57 0.08 0.49 0.66 −0.41 −1.54 0.91 −2.45 −0.62 −3.07
Colorado 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.32 −1.76 −1.65 1.82 −3.47 0.17 −3.30
Connecticut 0.81 0.12 0.70 0.93 −0.41 −0.96 1.54 −2.50 0.58 −1.92
Florida 0.41 0.90 −0.49 1.32 0.34 −1.08 1.30 −2.38 0.21 −2.17
Georgia −0.21 0.73 −0.93 0.52 −0.86 −0.47 1.81 −2.28 1.34 −0.94
Iowa −0.62 −1.20 0.58 −1.82 −4.53 0.07 2.08 −2.01 2.15 0.14
Idaho −2.44 1.05 −3.49 −1.38 −4.90 −0.41 0.53 −0.94 0.12 −4.65
Illinois 0.04 0.93 −0.89 0.96 −0.33 −0.54 1.27 −1.81 0.72 −1.09
Indiana −0.37 1.35 −1.72 0.98 −0.83 −0.01 1.57 −1.58 1.56 −1.05
Kansas −1.39 0.26 −1.64 −1.13 −3.84 0.11 1.46 −1.36 1.57 −0.29
Kentucky −0.24 0.71 −0.95 0.46 −0.51 −0.59 0.91 −1.50 0.32 −1.18
Louisiana 1.04 0.68 0.36 1.72 −0.43 −1.20 0.88 −2.08 −0.32 −2.40
Massachusetts 0.64 0.24 0.40 0.88 0.03 −0.95 1.83 −2.78 0.88 −1.90
Maryland −0.49 −0.46 −0.03 −0.95 −2.06 −0.16 0.39 −0.56 0.23 −0.64
Maine −0.58 0.82 −1.40 0.24 −2.22 −0.98 1.45 −2.43 0.46 −3.50
Michigan −0.51 3.12 −3.64 2.61 −1.07 0.32 2.83 −2.51 3.15 −2.43
Minnesota 0.50 0.57 −0.07 1.06 0.32 −1.05 0.83 −1.88 −0.23 −2.16
Missouri −0.01 0.81 −0.82 0.80 −0.19 −0.71 2.05 −2.76 1.34 −1.42
Mississippi −0.21 0.47 −0.68 0.27 −1.21 −0.01 0.96 −0.98 0.95 −0.39
Montana −0.87 0.94 −1.80 0.07 −6.74 −0.37 −0.21 −0.15 −0.58 −2.14
North Carolina −0.59 0.27 −0.85 −0.32 −1.30 −0.18 1.58 −1.76 1.39 −0.37
Nebraska 0.45 0.63 −0.18 1.08 −1.08 −1.92 0.07 −1.99 −1.84 −3.85
New Hampshire 0.39 −0.04 0.43 0.34 −0.28 −1.57 1.66 −3.22 0.09 −3.13
New Jersey 0.06 −0.06 0.12 0.00 −1.00 −0.78 1.01 −1.79 0.22 −1.57
Nevada 1.29 2.98 −1.69 4.27 2.00 −2.26 0.22 −2.48 −2.04 −5.25
New York 0.86 0.56 0.30 1.42 0.22 −1.22 1.07 −2.28 −0.15 −2.44
Ohio −0.06 1.13 −1.19 1.07 −0.28 −0.26 2.01 −2.27 1.75 −1.44
Oklahoma 0.89 −0.17 1.06 0.72 −1.62 −1.61 3.59 −5.20 1.98 −3.22
Oregon 0.30 1.26 −0.95 1.56 −1.62 −0.69 1.07 −1.76 0.38 −1.89
Pennsylvania 0.22 0.17 0.05 0.38 −0.46 −0.43 1.41 −1.85 0.98 −0.87
South Carolina −0.13 −0.44 0.31 −0.57 −1.68 −0.65 1.92 −2.57 1.27 −1.31
Tennessee −0.04 1.06 −1.11 1.02 −0.29 −0.57 1.35 −1.91 0.78 −1.14
Texas 0.55 −0.65 1.21 −0.10 −1.40 −1.22 2.10 −3.33 0.88 −2.45
Utah −0.30 1.19 −1.50 0.89 −2.47 −1.22 0.34 −1.56 −0.88 −2.84
Virginia −0.37 0.28 −0.66 −0.09 −1.19 0.00 1.17 −1.18 1.17 −0.06
Washington 0.18 0.66 −0.48 0.83 −1.65 −1.73 1.06 −2.79 −0.66 −3.46
Wisconsin −0.13 0.92 −1.05 0.79 −1.10 −0.22 1.06 −1.28 0.84 −0.78
points for Michigan, and 1.13 (2.01) for Ohio.
The corresponding change for a 15% unex-
pected oil price change is 0.70 (0.02) percentage
points for Michigan and 0.11 (0.21) percentage
points for Ohio. Moreover, the IRF depicted in
Figure 4 reveal that the responses of state-level
job destruction to a positive shock strongly
differ from the responses of job destruction to a
negative shock. Table 3 reflects that the 1-year
cumulative response of job destruction to a nega-
tive oil price shock exceeds the 1-year cumulative
response of job destruction to a positive oil price
shock for most states. More than that, for almost
all states, the cumulative response of job destruc-
tion is positive for both positive and negative oil
price innovations. This result indicates that large
oil price shocks, regardless of their sign, trigger
firms to shed more jobs across states.
The 1-year cumulative response of net
employment to a negative oil price shock is
negative for total manufacturing and all U.S.
states. For a positive oil price shock, the 1-
year cumulative response of net employment is
negative for total manufacturing and 25 out of
40 U.S. states. Note that the 1-year cumulative
change triggered by a negative oil price shock
exceeds the 1-year cumulative response of net
employment following a positive oil price shock
for almost all states. These findings indicate that
both positive and negative oil price innovations
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FIGURE 4
The Responses of Job Destruction to Positive and Negative Oil Price Shocks of 2 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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have a negative effect on manufacturing net
employment across states.
A large positive oil price shock triggers sub-
stantial changes in job reallocation across states.
Table 3 reflects that following a positive (neg-
ative) oil price shock, the 1-year cumulative
change in gross job reallocation ranges between
−1.82 (−2.04) and 4.27 (3.15) percentage points.
For instance following a positive (negative) oil
price shock, the 1-year cumulative response of
gross job reallocation is 2.61 (3.15) percentage
points forMichigan and 4.27 (−2.04) for Nevada.
These effects are almost three times larger than
the response of gross job reallocation to a 1 SD
shock. Similarly, Table 3 shows important het-
erogeneity in the 1-year cumulative response of
excess job reallocation to large oil price shocks.
For a positive (negative) oil price shock, the 1-
year cumulative response of excess job realloca-
tion to a large shock is more than twice as large
the 1-year cumulative response of excess job real-
location for a 1 SD for 20 out of 31 U.S. states.
V. TEST OF SYMMETRY
Given the ample evidence in the previous
section that oil price innovations trigger impor-
tant asymmetries in the response of job flows to
positive and negative oil price innovations, in this
section, I use a formal test of symmetry as in KV
(2011) to evaluate whether the observed asymme-
tries in the impulse responses are significant. The
test of symmetry is based on the following null
hypothesis for job creation:
Ho ∶ IPOS (h, δ) = −IPOS (h,−δ)
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
and similarly for the job destruction:
Ho ∶ INEG (h, δ) = −INEG (h,−δ)
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
In addition, I conduct the test of symmetry
to evaluate whether net employment, gross job
reallocation, and excess job reallocation respond
asymmetrically to positive and negative oil
price innovations:
Ho ∶ INET (h, δ) = −INET (h,−δ)
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
Ho ∶ ISUM (h, δ) = −ISUM (h,−δ)
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
Ho ∶ IEXC (h, δ) = −IEXC (h,−δ)
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
I set H = 4, to reduce the data mining prob-
lem associated with repeating the test across sev-
eral horizons. Table 4 reports the p values for
this test for both 1 SD and 2 SD shocks. For a
typical shock of 1 SD, the null of symmetry in
the response of job destruction and net employ-
ment to positive and negative oil price innova-
tions is only rejected for Georgia at the 5% level. I
find no evidence against the null of symmetry for
job creation, gross job reallocation, and excess
job reallocation.
For a large shock of 2 SD, the null of sym-
metry for job destruction is rejected for total
manufacturing and a few states (5 out of 40
states). I find no evidence of asymmetries in the
response of job creation to oil price increases
and decreases. For the net employment change, I
reject the null of symmetry for total manufactur-
ing and 6 out of 40 states. Moreover, I only find
evidence of asymmetries in the response of gross
job reallocation to positive and negative oil price
innovations for 4 out of 40 states.
Given that I have conducted the same test of
symmetry for different state-level job flows, a
common concern in this approach is that there
is an element of data mining. To address this
concern, I construct data mining robust critical
values by simulating the null distribution of the
supremum of the bootstrap Wald test statistic for
all U.S. states and for both x1t and x
4
t nonlinear
transformations for the real price of oil as in
Herrera and Karaki (2015).10 Evidence of asym-
metries completely vanishes after accounting for
data mining robust critical values.11
VI. THE ALLOCATIVE CHANNEL OF OIL PRICE
SHOCKS
One main transmission mechanism through
which oil price shocks operate is the costly
reallocation channel. This channel indicates that
regardless of the direction of the oil price change,
resources will be relocated from industries that
are damaged from the oil price change to indus-
tries that benefit from the change in the real price
10. Work by Inoue and Kilian (2004) and Kilian and Vega
(2011) explain in detail the effect of data mining and solutions
for this problem.
11. I also obtain very similar results using the net oil price
increase measure (see Table A.3).
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TABLE 4
Test of Symmetry for Positive and Negative Oil Price Innovations (x#t = x
1
t )
Typical Shock 1SD Large Shock 2SD
Sector POS NEG NET SUM EXC POS NEG NET SUM EXC
Total manufacturing 0.58 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.31 0.55 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.65
Alabama 0.73 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.50 0.70 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.66
Arkansas 0.89 0.66 0.68 0.82 0.43 0.88 0.63 0.66 0.81 0.69
Arizona 0.34 0.23 0.46 0.16 0.08 0.21 0.17 0.41 0.08 0.09
California 0.54 0.86 0.57 0.97 0.18 0.41 0.86 0.54 0.97 0.39
Colorado 0.25 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
Connecticut 0.90 0.30 0.37 0.57 0.19 0.90 0.22 0.30 0.51 0.63
Florida 0.89 0.25 0.39 0.45 0.41 0.87 0.21 0.33 0.42 0.80
Georgia 0.84 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.39 0.81 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.57
Iowa 0.68 0.60 0.49 0.85 0.10 0.65 0.53 0.42 0.84 0.18
Idaho 0.18 0.91 0.25 0.49 0.04 0.05 0.91 0.12 0.36 0.05
Illinois 0.46 0.16 0.18 0.42 0.61 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.41 0.48
Indiana 0.54 0.31 0.21 0.53 0.31 0.43 0.26 0.12 0.52 0.71
Kansas 0.48 0.38 0.37 0.58 0.33 0.38 0.33 0.30 0.53 0.36
Kentucky 0.84 0.38 0.51 0.50 0.89 0.82 0.39 0.52 0.50 0.85
Louisiana 0.99 0.23 0.23 0.44 0.12 0.99 0.16 0.15 0.40 0.26
Massachusetts 0.35 0.59 0.31 0.71 0.32 0.23 0.54 0.20 0.69 0.50
Maryland 0.56 0.68 0.94 0.27 0.47 0.51 0.66 0.95 0.18 0.33
Maine 0.27 0.28 0.09 0.98 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.03 0.98 0.32
Michigan 0.24 0.16 0.11 0.51 0.44 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.41 0.41
Minnesota 0.96 0.89 0.78 0.98 0.51 0.95 0.88 0.76 0.98 0.84
Missouri 0.41 0.16 0.11 0.27 0.43 0.31 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.39
Mississippi 0.41 0.15 0.42 0.06 0.56 0.24 0.09 0.36 0.01 0.19
Montana 0.68 0.27 0.25 0.75 0.15 0.58 0.10 0.09 0.70 0.23
North Carolina 0.54 0.40 0.40 0.55 0.44 0.45 0.34 0.35 0.50 0.54
Nebraska 0.88 0.26 0.33 0.56 0.35 0.88 0.20 0.29 0.50 0.41
New Hampshire 0.65 0.84 0.62 0.91 0.19 0.59 0.84 0.60 0.91 0.36
New Jersey 0.43 0.71 0.59 0.50 0.11 0.35 0.72 0.58 0.44 0.10
Nevada 0.39 0.80 0.79 0.44 0.43 0.25 0.77 0.77 0.30 0.28
New York 0.69 0.50 0.43 0.66 0.28 0.64 0.42 0.32 0.63 0.46
Ohio 0.27 0.10 0.07 0.26 0.51 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.20 0.76
Oklahoma 0.76 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.00 0.73 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.07
Oregon 0.92 0.39 0.55 0.39 0.34 0.91 0.28 0.46 0.26 0.38
Pennsylvania 0.33 0.62 0.68 0.47 0.51 0.22 0.60 0.66 0.42 0.44
South Carolina 0.62 0.70 0.57 0.88 0.07 0.49 0.66 0.48 0.88 0.45
Tennessee 0.85 0.17 0.27 0.44 0.72 0.84 0.13 0.18 0.43 0.77
Texas 0.47 0.68 0.77 0.68 0.10 0.39 0.66 0.75 0.67 0.13
Utah 0.37 0.29 0.77 0.10 0.11 0.30 0.24 0.76 0.04 0.17
Virginia 0.42 0.21 0.44 0.15 0.45 0.21 0.14 0.40 0.04 0.30
Washington 0.54 0.38 0.27 0.91 0.18 0.45 0.32 0.17 0.89 0.41
Wisconsin 0.42 0.72 0.52 0.83 0.70 0.37 0.72 0.51 0.81 0.68
Notes: Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of model (6a–c). p values are based on the χ2H+1. Bold and italics refer
to significance at the 5% and 10% significance level, respectively.
of oil. Because I found no evidence that posi-
tive and negative oil price innovations have asym-
metric effects on job flows, I focus here on the
effect of a positive oil price shock on state-level
job reallocation. In fact, because different states
have a differentmix of industries, then one impor-
tant investigation is to evaluate whether a posi-
tive oil price shock triggers important realloca-
tive effects across U.S. states. Figures 5 and 6
report the response of job creation, job destruc-
tion, gross job reallocation, and excess job real-
location to a positive oil price shock of 1 SD and
2 SD, respectively.12 The IRF reveal substantial
differences in the responses of gross job realloca-
tion and excess job reallocation across U.S. states
and show that the largest change in the response
of job reallocation occurs within a year following
an unexpected positive oil price innovation.
To evaluate whether an unexpected oil price
increase triggers significant changes in state-level
12. The results for the remaining states are reported in
Appendix S1 (see Figure A.5a–c and Figure A.6a–c). Note
also that the results based on the net oil price increase measure
are reported in Appendix S1 (see Figure A.11a–c and Figure
A.12a–c).
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FIGURE 5
The Responses of Job Flows to a Positive Oil Price Shock of 1 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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FIGURE 6
The Responses of Job Flows to a Positive Oil Price Shock of 2 SD (x≠t = x1t ).
Notes: Squares and diamonds represent significance at the 5% and 10%, respectively. Computations are based on 10,000
simulations.
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job reallocation, I implement the test for the
absence of job reallocation byHerrera and Karaki
(2015) where:
Ho ∶ INEG (h, δ) + IPOS (h, δ) = 0
for h = 0, 1, 2, … ,H.
The test is computed for H = 4 to reduce the data
mining problem arising from repeatedly applying
the test for different horizons. The focus is mainly
on the four-quarter effect given that there is ample
evidence that oil price shocks have their largest
effects 1-year after the shock.13
Table 5 reports the p values for the test of the
absence of job reallocation based on conventional
critical values for both 1 SD and 2 SD shocks.
Table 5 reveals that, for a 1 SD oil price innova-
tion, the null of the absence of job reallocation
cannot be rejected for total manufacturing and
all U.S. states at the 10% significance level. For
a large shock, a 2 SD oil price innovation, the
effect of oil price shocks on job reallocation is
only significant at the 10% for Mississippi and
Virginia. The null for the absence of job real-
location cannot be rejected for any state after
using data mining robust critical values. Note that
results reported in Appendix S1 also show that
using the 1 year net oil price increase, as a non-
linear transformation in the real price of oil, leads
to very similar results.14 These findings indicate
that oil price innovations have almost no effect
on job reallocation across U.S. states, which indi-
cates that oil price shocks mainly operate through
aggregate channels.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper studied the effect of oil price
innovations on manufacturing job flows across
U.S. states. Unlike previous studies that solely
focused on industry-level data and were based on
a small dataset due to the change in the industry
classification from SIC to NAICS, this study
is based on a larger dataset on manufacturing
state-level job creation and job destruction rates.
The dataset comprises different periods of oil
price fluctuations including the recent oil price
declines that started in 2014.
I used a structural equation model that nests
both symmetric and asymmetric effects of oil
13. See Davis and Haltiwanger (2001), Lee, Ni, and Ratti
(1995), and Herrera and Karaki (2015).
14. See Table A.4 of Appendix S1.
TABLE 5
Test for the Absence of Job Reallocation
(x#t = x
1
t )
Sector
Typical
Shock 1 SD
Large
Shock 2 SD
Total manufacturing 0.81 0.76
Alabama 0.69 0.42
Arkansas 0.89 0.88
Arizona 0.56 0.24
California 0.91 0.93
Colorado 0.52 0.18
Connecticut 0.97 0.92
Florida 0.83 0.71
Georgia 0.93 0.79
Iowa 0.42 0.70
Idaho 0.42 0.44
Illinois 0.70 0.50
Indiana 0.66 0.75
Kansas 0.50 0.54
Kentucky 0.91 0.79
Louisiana 0.48 0.47
Massachusetts 0.93 0.93
Maryland 0.50 0.44
Maine 0.80 0.86
Michigan 0.90 0.76
Minnesota 0.97 0.98
Missouri 0.27 0.37
Mississippi 0.42 0.10
Montana 0.75 0.67
North Carolina 0.63 0.70
Nebraska 0.77 0.74
New Hampshire 0.48 0.74
New Jersey 0.58 0.52
Nevada 0.40 0.50
New York 0.38 0.44
Ohio 0.54 0.61
Oklahoma 0.24 0.12
Oregon 0.41 0.24
Pennsylvania 0.94 0.81
South Carolina 0.81 0.96
Tennessee 0.77 0.76
Texas 0.45 0.45
Utah 0.71 0.40
Virginia 0.15 0.07
Washington 0.79 0.80
Wisconsin 0.57 0.62
Notes: Computations are based on 10,000 simulations of
model (6a–c). p values are based on the χ2
H+1. Italics refers to
significance at the 10% significance level.
price shocks on job creation and job destruc-
tion. I estimated the model by OLS and computed
IRF by Monte Carlo integration that account for
the history and the size of the shock, to exam-
ine the dynamic effect of oil price shocks on job
flows. The IRF revealed important heterogeneity
in the responses of job creation and job destruc-
tion across different states. For instance follow-
ing a positive oil price shock, some states like
Idaho and Michigan are damaged, whereas other
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states like Oklahoma and Texas tend to bene-
fit. In addition, I found important asymmetries
in the responses of job creation and job destruc-
tion to positive and negative oil price innovations.
To evaluate whether these asymmetries in the
impulse responses are significant, I followed KV
(2011) and conducted a test of symmetry. Results
reveal that for a typical shock, the null of symme-
try is not rejected for all state-level job creation
and job destruction rates. Little evidence against
the null of symmetry is found for a large shock.
Furthermore, all evidence against the null of sym-
metry completely vanishes after accounting for
data mining.
To assess whether oil price shocks trigger
important allocative effects, I studied the effect
of a positive oil price shock on job realloca-
tion. By evaluating whether oil price shocks trig-
ger a reallocation of jobs across U.S. states, I
directly contribute to the literature interested in
studying regional U.S. business cycles. I imple-
mented a test for the absence of job reallocation
following Herrera and Karaki (2015) and found
no evidence that an unexpected positive oil price
shock has a significant effect on job reallocation
across U.S. states. These findings are in line with
Herrera and Karaki (2015) who also found that
oil price shocks mainly operate through aggre-
gate channels.
APPENDIX
I compute IRF by Monte Carlo integration that account
for the history and the size of the shock as follows:
1. I store the estimated coefficients, standard errors, and
residuals obtained from estimating model (6a–c) by OLS.
2. I condition on a given history {xt−1, … , xt−p,NEGt−1,
..., NEGt−p, POSt−1, ... , POSt− p}= {Xt ,Nt,Pt}∈Ωt and I
generate two time paths, for oil (xt), job destruction (NEGt)
and job creation (POSt). The first path for xt (x
1
t ) is generated
by tracing the response of xt to an oil price innovation of size
δ (1 or 2 SD). The other time path for xt (x2t ) is generated
by tracing the response of xt to a shock ϵ1t drawn from the
empirical distribution of ϵ1t .
3. The updated information sets along with the censored
variables are I1t = {1, x
1
t , Xt , Nt , Pt , x
1#
t , X
1#
t } and I
2
t = {1,
x2t , Xt , Nt, Pt , x
2#
t , X
2#
t }. Given these two histories, two paths
for NEGt are generated. The first time path for NEGt (NEG
1
t )
is generated by tracing the response of NEGt to a shock ϵ2t
drawn from the empirical distribution of ϵ2t and using the
information set I1t and the other time path for NEGt (NEG
2
t )
is obtained by tracing the response of NEGt to a shock ϵ2t
drawn from the empirical distribution of ϵ2t and using the
information set I2t .
4. The new updated information sets are now defined as
Ĩ1t = {1, x
1
t , N
1
t , Xt , Nt, Pt , x
1#
t , X
1#
t } and Ĩ
2
t = {1, x
2
t , N
2
t ,
Xt , Nt , Pt , x
2#
t , X
2#
t }. Given these two histories, two paths
for POSt are generated. The first time path for POSt (POS
1
t )
is generated by tracing the response of POSt to a shock ϵ3t
drawn from the empirical distribution of ϵ3t and using the
information set Ĩ1t and the other time path for POSt (POS
2
t )
is obtained by tracing the response of POSt to a shock ϵ3t
drawn from the empirical distribution of ϵ3t and using the
information set Ĩ2t .
5. Steps 2–4 are repeated forH+1 times (whereH = 12).
6. After R (I set R= 10, 000) replications of steps
(2)–(4), I generate the conditional IRF as
INEG
(
h, δ,Ωt
)
= 1
R
R∑
r=1
NEG1t,r −
1
R
R∑
r=1
NEG2t,r
for h = 0, 1, … ,H
and
IPOS
(
h, δ,Ωt
)
= 1
R
R∑
r=1
POS1t,r −
1
R
R∑
r=1
POS2t,r
for h = 0, 1, … ,H.
7. The unconditional IRF are generated by repeating (2)
to (6) for all possibleΩt, and then taking the mean over all the
histories.
INEG (h, δ) = ∫ INEG
(
h, δ,Ωt
)
dΩt
and
IPOS (h, δ) = ∫ IPOS
(
h, δ,Ωt
)
dΩt.
I also follow the same approach for a negative shock −
δ, to obtain the unconditional response of job destruction,
INEG(h,−δ), and the unconditional response for job creation,
IPOS(h,−δ).
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